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Introduction
1 On 8 September 1726, the Dutch Republic and the Regency of Algiers concluded a peace
treaty after having been at war for more than 88 of the previous 126 years. The two
states had been in conflict during the periods from February 1618 to October 1622, from
August 1630 to April 1662, from July 1664 to April 1679, from March 1686 to June 1712
and from December 1715 to September 1726. The years 1600-1616 had seen a difficult
phase of neither peace nor war with occasional captures of Dutch ships, whereas the
time from August 1616 to February 1618 can be regarded as a time of peace when a
Dutch consul had served without much trouble in Algiers. The treaty of 1726 became
the watershed. Until the French occupation of 1795, the Dutch Republic endured only
one more war with Algiers, from February 1755 to November 1757, a short annoyance
in an otherwise generally harmonious relationship.1
2 The war of 1715-1726 was thus decisive. Financially and economically exhausted by the
War of the Spanish Succession, the Dutch Republic soon after the peace of Utrecht had
to deal with an enigmatic and elusive enemy far away. In the end the success seemingly
justified the sacrifices. When the ink dried on the peace treaty in the September sun of
Algiers in 1726, the leaders and inhabitants of the Dutch Republic had achieved one of
their  foremost  goals,  one that  they had been pursuing for  more than a  decade.  In
contrast to the great importance contemporaries accorded to this peace, its treatment
in historical writing is close to non-existent. This is perhaps due to a general neglect of
Mediterranean in favor of Atlantic history in the eighteenth century.2 One may go even
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further: the importance of Algiers for European economic and political history remains
underestimated to this day, to the detriment of our understanding of the importance of
relations between the Mediterranean and Northern Europe.3
3 This paper aims to partially redress this situation by studying the relations between the
leading commercial nation of early modern Europe and the strongest North African
regency to gain insight into a specific aspect of Europe’s economic history. Moreover,
the  paper  highlights  an important  part  of  the  history  of  Dutch engagement  in  the
eighteenth-century Mediterranean world, a topic about which, according to two of the
foremost specialists on Dutch economic history, we still know relatively little.4
4 The basic hypothesis here is: The Dutch-Algerian war was one of the most important
factors leading to the structural loss of market share in Mediterranean shipping and
trade by the Dutch to the advantage of the British in the early eighteenth century. The
particular  vulnerability  of  European  shipping  to  Muslim  corsairs  in  this  region
influenced  the  fate  of  important  segments  of  the  Dutch  and  British  economies.5
Nowhere does this become as evident as in the Dutch-Algerian war of 1715-1726. We
will describe the context, the actual events and the results of this war to highlight the
structural parameters that defined and shaped the interaction between Northwestern
and Southern Europe. To illustrate the role and the political/economic power of the
Dutch merchants, how they functioned as a network and acted to change the foreign
policy of the States-General, special use shall be made of memorandums and diplomatic
correspondence. These show the Dutch point of view on the international scene and the




5 Throughout the entire early modern age, the exchange of goods between Northern and
Southern Europe remained one of the most profitable branches of trade. This was one
of  the  pillars  on  which the  fortunes  of  the  Dutch Republic  rested.  Being  favorably
situated at  the mouth of  the Rhine-Maas delta  and located between the Baltic  and
Southern European ports, the Republic had emerged as an important trade emporium
during the sixteenth century and was able to retain this position in many regards until
the French Revolution.6
6 The ideal  situation for  the  Republic’s  shipping was  one  of  complete  peace  all  over
Europe.  With Amsterdam being the “information staple” of  Europe for  most  of  the
seventeenth century and attracting well-qualified but not too highly-paid sailors from
Germany and Scandinavia, its merchants and shippers were usually able to undercut
the freight rates of all competitors and thus secure a rather large market share in every
corner of the continent.7 A network of secure and unthreatened shipping lanes from
Alexandria and Constantinople up to Archangelsk and the Baltic, with the Republic in
the middle, was certainly the dream of many leaders of the Republic.8 In reality this had
only rarely been attainable. Several wars with the greater European powers, continuing
through every decade from 1568 to 1715, had often hampered Dutch shipping. Luckily
for  the  Republic,  the  shipping  activities  of  its  main  competitor,  England,  suffered
mostly just as much –often simultaneously– during these wars, either as the enemy of
the  Republic  or  as  its  ally.  But  when  this  was  not  the  case,  this  was  to  the  great
detriment of the Republic’s shipping. From 1674 to 1678, England was neutral while the
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Dutch were engaged in a fierce war against France: this gave a strong boost to English
shipping  and  trade.9 However,  after  1678,  the  Dutch  were  able  to  regain  their
competitiveness in the intra-European seaborne trades, proving that the damage had
not been structural.
7 A very different situation prevailed in the Mediterranean and on the Atlantic seaboard
of the Iberian Peninsula. These Southern European waters were an area where Barbary
corsairs  from  Northern  Africa  operated  in  large  numbers  and  over  the  years  took
hundreds, even thousands, of European ships. For Northern Europeans this was a great
problem; yet on the whole it remained manageable for each single political entity as
long  as  the  principal  competitors  also  suffered.  If  everybody  sailed  with  the  same
degree of danger or safety, nobody lost or won too much. For most of the seventeenth
century, simple measures sufficed to protect one’s shipping. Practically all Northern
Europeans recurred to convoys, especially between 1620 and 1720 for their southbound
shipping.10 This certainly caused a rise in transport costs but it was an enforceable and
pragmatic measure that served well as long as no better alternative was at hand. Peace
treaties between the Northern powers and the Barbary corsairs would certainly have
been  a  less  costly  alternative,  but  only  if  the  clause  “Free  Ship–Free  Goods”  were
included. Without this explicit guarantee of immunity, if the corsairs had the right to
seize enemy goods on neutral ships, the advantage of neutrality would have been lost,
stripping peace treaties of any practical use.11
8 Until 1662 no nation had been able to extract the principle “Free Ship–Free Goods”
from the corsairs on a permanent basis.12 With England obtaining this clause that year,
the  situation  changed  fundamentally.  England  introduced  a  set  of  unforgeable  and
obligatory  “Algerian  passports”  for  its  southbound  merchant  ships  and  thus
guaranteed the authenticity of each of them in case they met up with Algerian corsairs.
13 Faced with strong subsequent growth of the English fleet in the Mediterranean, the
Algerians broke this peace twice in the following years (1668-1671, 1678-1682) and tried
to wage a privateer war against England, only to find out each time that England was
able to hit back with overwhelming might. The two wars ended negatively for Algiers,
and when faced with dangerous French attacks in the 1680s, Algiers definitively opted
for peace with England, which was to last for over 140 years.14
9 England thereby had obtained a structural advantage in Southern European waters.
English  ships  could  now  sail  in  times  of  intra-European  peace  without  expensive
convoys.  The  Dutch  suffered  from  this  situation.  In  Southern  European  waters,
Northern European shipowners made substantial profits through carrying trade for a
wide  array  of  international  merchants,  be  they  Armenians,  Greeks,  Jews,  Turks,
Italians, Spaniards, Germans or from any other nation. The environment was highly
competitive, and it became even more so when the French substantially strengthened
their shipping within the Mediterranean from the late seventeenth century onwards.15
The  Dutch  realized  the  consequences  of  the  English-Algerian  peace  for  their  own
shipping  activities.  Various  reports  from  the  court  of  Madrid  or  from  Armenian
merchants in Messina arrived at The Hague and all pointed out that freight was shifting
from the Dutch to the English.16 From 1661 to 1663, the Republic thus sent out several
squadrons of warships under the command of Michiel de Ruyter to tackle the problem
and force the Algerians, and with them the other regencies, to accept a lasting peace
treaty.17
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10 Yet,  as  in  the  following  decades,  military  action  was  doomed  to  failure  since  the
Republic  was  too  often  engaged  in  continental  affairs  that  required  attention  and
resources. Attempts to achieve stable relations with Algiers did not work over the long
run. From 1679 to 1686 the Republic was able to maintain an uneasy peace with Algiers
and thus to secure an important share of the peacetime trade with Southern Europe.18
The Algerian declaration of war in 1686 hurt Dutch shipping in this region,19 yet, with
the  outbreak  of  the  general  European  conflict  in  1689,  the  danger  of  the  Barbary
corsairs  lost  some  of  its  urgency.  For  the  following  decades  French  corsairs  from
Dunkirk and Brest were the greatest danger, and both England and the Dutch Republic
suffered from their depredations.20
11 Nevertheless,  England  held  a  structural  advantage  over  its  Dutch  competitors  in
Southern European waters thanks to its treaties with the Barbary regencies.  This is
most likely the basis for Jonathan Israel’s conclusion: “during phase four (1647-88) the
English  seaborne trade to  Turkey exceeded the  Dutch by  something like  a  ratio  of
around five to four […]. This is especially noteworthy in that the Levant trade can in
some respects be said to have been more vital to the Dutch Republic than to England”.21
12 Why did the Algerians choose England and not the Dutch Republic as a partner? The
answer  is  closely  linked  to  the  decentralized  structure  of  the  Republic.  A  more
centralized state like England could issue a specific and unforgeable type of Algerian
passport.  The  passport  regulations  stipulated  that  only  captains  commanding ships
owned by  English  merchants  and manned by  a  crew of  at  least  two-thirds  English
sailors were entitled to carry this kind of document.22 Thus the passport ensured the
authenticity of English ships. This system showed the Algerian corsairs that no ships
from any other nation could sail under the English flag and thereby profit from the
peace treaty. In the Dutch Republic, seven provinces each had their own specific type of
passport, usually consisting of a rather simple paper engraving. This was at times a
substantial boon to Northern Germans. In Hamburg and, to a lesser degree, in the other
Northern German cities, a large black market for Dutch passports existed which was
facilitated by the great autonomy of the Republic’s provinces. After 1662 the Algerians
regularly demanded a uniform passport from the Dutch Republic, often with explicit
reference to the ongoing forgery in Hamburg. Yet, for decades the Dutch Republic was
unable  to  produce  this  sort  of  document.  The  Dutch  Republic  was  finally  able  to
procure a unified passport in 1712,  but it  learned just a few months later that this
model, too, had been forged in Hamburg.23
13 The result was a bitter blow for the Republic. In December 1715 Algiers declared war on
the Republic. The official reason given by the Algerians was that the Dutch had been
too slow to buy back their enslaved compatriots and had not delivered war munitions
as promised.24 Yet a simple glance at the statistics reveals the great amount of Dutch
merchant shipping in Southern European waters at the time of the declaration of war.25
The Algerian corsairs had been encountering many undefended Dutch ships for years,
and only very few from other northern nations, which could be regarded as legitimate
targets. This was to the advantage of Morocco, which had been able to attract several
Algerian captains with their ships and crews from 1712 to 1715 with the promise of
potential Dutch prey.26 The difficulties this caused to Algiers and the supposition that
many of the allegedly Dutch ships were from Hamburg or Scandinavia convinced the
Algerian  government  of  the  advantages  of  a  declaration  of  war  against  the  United
Provinces.
The Dutch-Algerian War and the Rise of British Shipping to Southern Europe (1...




14 For two full years the Republic did not react to the Algerian threat. Maybe its leaders
hoped that the Algerians were not all that powerful on the oceans, since decades of
international convoying had not allowed many captures of northern ships. But their
hopes were misplaced. Just months after the outbreak of hostilities, Dutch ships were
captured,  wreaking havoc on the Republic’s  southbound shipping.  Perhaps Algeria’s
surprising strength was due to the reacquisition of Oran in 1708.27 Whatever the precise
reason, 1716 witnessed what was nearly an annihilation of Dutch shipping in Southern
European waters, with the loss of 15 merchant ships and their 359 sailors captured by
the  corsairs.28 For  the  first  time  in  decades,  British  shipping  marginalized  Dutch
competitors in this branch of intra-European maritime trade. The fact that the British
could obtain this result despite their problems in the Baltic, where they fought a war
against Sweden from 1715 to 1719, and despite the great economic crisis that hit Britain
in 1720, gives us an idea of the impact of Algerian corsairs. Gibraltar flourished under
British rule, mostly thanks to a growing community of Jewish traders and their families
who were experts in legal trade and smuggling.29 The possession of this base was an
important boon to British trade in Southern European waters.30
15 Even though we do not have sound statistics for the Mediterranean, a good indication
of the impact of corsairs can be deduced from the respective intensity of Dutch and
British shipping to Portugal. The salt flats of this country were important destinations
for the ships of Northern Europe. Not only did both countries supply their home ports
with Portuguese salt, but they also competed intensely in furnishing Baltic countries
with it. Thus, Dutch and British ships regularly sailed directly through the strait of the
Sound at Helsingør after having fetched salt from Portugal. Since the entire Portuguese
coast  was  vulnerable  to  Barbary corsairs,  we can obtain  insight  into  the  impact  of
Barbary privateering by looking at the traffic of Dutch and British ships sailing from
Portugal to the Baltic. The result shows us how strong the Algerian factor was:
 
Table. Ships passing the Sound eastwards coming from a Portuguese harbor 31
Year British Dutch  Year British Dutch
1712 7 12  1724 28 10
1713 20 14  1725 28 18
1714 37 50  1726 31 12
1715 27 58  1727 18 24
1716 20 2  1728 27 38
1717 18 4  1729 18 19
1718 22 18 1730 10 16
1719 17 19  1731 13 14
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1720 11 28  1732 1 4
1721 14 34  1733 6 13
1722 66 19  1734 10 18
1723 29 24  1735 23 23
16 The strong fluctuations between the years 1715-1716 and 1721-1722 as well as the lesser
but still substantial shift between 1726 and 1727 are all connected to the war, as we will
show  below.  Before  we  analyze  the  evolution  in  detail,  it  should  be  stressed  that
whereas only 50 percent of the British ships came from London, up to 90 percent of the
Dutch  ships  came  from  the  province  of  Holland,  mostly  from  Amsterdam.
Mediterranean  affairs  in  the  Republic  were  first  and  foremost  a  problem  for  the
merchants  and  shipowners  from  Holland,  while  in  Britain  we  see  a  stronger
engagement of all parts of the United Kingdom. In a decentralized state like the United
Provinces  this  delayed  actions  at  the  national  level,  which  at  times  caused  the
Republic’s leaders to react slowly in the crisis to come.
17 In 1714 and 1715 merchants from Amsterdam had made an immense effort to benefit
from the state of neutrality in the Baltic and to monopolize the salt export trade from
Portugal to this region.32 By buying up all  available salt,  they hoped that the Baltic
countries would be forced to contend with high prices on the Amsterdam market. This
explains  the  high  numbers  of  Dutch  ships  passing  the  Sound  in  these  two  years.
However,  the Baltic and Northern European market was soon saturated. Worse,  the
high prices could not be sustained since British competition remained stronger than
expected33 and various other sources of salt were still available to the Baltic countries,
for example from Lüneburg34 or from Prussia via Königsberg.35 The Algerian declaration
of war, which caused a strong rise in insurance rates on shipping, thus came on top of
an already precarious situation, attested to by the many bankruptcies of Amsterdam
merchant houses in or shortly after 1715.36
18 In 1716,  the  Dutch  had  to  face  the  fact  that  their  shipping  activities  in  Southern
European  waters  had  been  marginalized.  To  counter  this  catastrophe,  the  States-
General  sent a  squadron of  three warships into the Mediterranean in 1717 to hunt
Algerian corsairs and protect Dutch ships.37 Even though the warships could not catch
any corsairs, they were nevertheless capable of protecting Dutch merchant ships, none
of which was lost that year. In September 1717, old regulations for navigation in the
Mediterranean were renewed, officially because of the broken peace by Morocco and
Algiers. Sailing in packs of armed ships with a minimum number of sailors and weapons
was now mandatory for any Dutch vessel sailing to or from these waters.38
19 The following year, Dutch southbound shipping was already faring better, and intense
attempts were made to reach peace with the Algerians via the mediation of the Sultan
at Constantinople. The Algerians asked for an annual delivery of war materials for their
ships, the ransom of all captured Dutch sailors and the issuance of a uniform passport
in order to ensure that no Swedish, Danish or German ship could misuse these.39 The
negotiations bore no fruit since the Dutch government refused to pay a ransom for
enslaved  sailors  with  public  funds.  In  their  eyes  this  duty  fell  on  relatives  and
shipowners. Yet, the Republic did not send any new squadrons for three years from
The Dutch-Algerian War and the Rise of British Shipping to Southern Europe (1...
Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 90 | 2015
6
1718 to 1720, perhaps hoping that the now better armed ships could defend themselves
adequately when sailing together. But the strategy of waiting out the problem did not
work. In these three years, the Dutch lost no fewer than 25 ships with 550 sailors to the
Algerians  and Moroccans.40 It  was only  thanks to  Swedish privateers  who hindered
British shipping in the Baltic that Dutch southbound shipping could remain ahead of its
main  competitor.  French  shipping  in  Southern  European  waters,  on  the  contrary,
benefited greatly from the problems of France’s northern competitors.41
20 The  inactivity  of  the  States-General  caused  resentment  among  shipowners  and
merchants. Harsh criticism swelled against the Republic’s leaders when the failure of
the measures became obvious in 1720. When finally a letter from the Dutch consul in
Livorno arrived in the United Provinces in October 1720,  the merchants decided to
gather together and urge the government to take a more aggressive stance. In his letter
the consul gave a list of the latest captures. Among them there were many Dutch ships
as well as some from Hamburg and Denmark. The consul underlined the necessity of
peace, as the Algerians’ power was increasing with each new capture. In his opinion six
warships were necessary to cruise close to Gibraltar in order to deter the Algerians
from sailing into the Atlantic. The fleet, moreover, should occasionally escort Dutch
merchant ships into the Mediterranean.42
21 The  merchants  demanded  that  the  consul’s  suggestions  be  followed.  A  long
memorandum  was  drafted  and  printed  stating  that  39 Dutch  ships  with  909 sailors
(23.3 per ship on average) had been taken since 1714. The capital losses amounted to at
least six million guilders; another million were deemed necessary as ransom payments
for the sailors. However, this was not the main problem: The Republic had suffered
much  more  from  the  decline  of  its  shipping  to Southern  Europe.  It  had  become
necessary to man the ships with more sailors and to increase their salary. Thus, the
Republic’s  shipping  had  lost  its  competitiveness.  The  increase  of  Lübeck’s  and
Hamburg’s shipping to southern waters between 1717 and 1722 confirms this, as both
profited from the weakness of their main rival.43
22 The merchants demanded the formation of a stock company, called a Rederye, to wage
war against the corsairs. This company would finance a squadron of modern frigates in
the Mediterranean. The yearly costs for maintaining the operations of such a fleet were
estimated  at  383,400 guilders;  in  the  eyes  of  the  merchants  this  was  marginal  in
comparison to the current losses. Profits were to be made by a mixture of rewards for
captures of enemies or liberation of Dutch ships. Also, all Dutch merchant ships bound
for any European port south of Ushand (French Ouessant, a port close to Brest) should
pay different duties to the company.44 Additionally, every sailor on every ship of the
Republic,  including ships  of  the  two  Indian  companies,  would  have  to  pay  one-
twentieth  of  his  wage  for  the  Rederye,  whereas  officers  would  pay  one-tenth.  The
liberation of all Dutch sailors (whether from merchant ships or warships) captured by
the  North  Africans  was  also  an  important  task  for  the  Rederye.  This  was  a  social
measure but it also aimed at securing a long-standing peace with the regencies, since
the Algerians had used the slow Dutch ransoming as a pretext for declaring war on the
Republic in 1715.45 An additional system of retirement provisions was envisaged, and
the Rederye was to employ idle youths from the workhouses on their ships,  just as
Great Britain did.
23 All in all, the Rederye was intended to bring about a large transformation in the navy of
the Republic. New taxes on merchant shipping coupled with a vast range of rights and
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duties  of  the  Rederye  clearly  were  an  important  step  towards  nationalization  and
unification of the Republic’s naval system. Given that the decentralized system of five
admiralties had not helped against the depredations of the Algerians, the merchants of
Amsterdam demanded a change. The signatories primarily wanted to fight an efficient
war  against  Algiers  but  also  aimed  at  modernizing  the  naval  organization  of  the
Republic. The war against Algiers was in this regard important for achieving several
goals and for overhauling the entire navy.
24 It is therefore not surprising that a protracted debate ensued. Proponents printed a
description of the project with the clear intention of winning over large parts of the
merchant  community  and  the  elites  of  the  Republic.  The  text  was  translated  into
German and printed by an enthusiastic Hamburger who erroneously thought that the
Dutch would also fight for Hanseatic interests.46 In the papers of Isaac van Hoornbeek,
the  Grand  Pensionary  of  Holland  from  1720  to  1727,  there  is  a  long  handwritten
document weighing arguments for and against each paragraph of the project (the pros
being more frequent than the cons).  Cornelis  Schrijver,  the main proponent of  the
Rederye, formulated the argument in favor while an unknown opponent, most likely
from the admiralty of Amsterdam, provided the “critiques”.47
 
Image: The first page of the project
Source: Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, 3.01.20 - Isaac van Hoornbeek (1720-1727),
Nr. 459.
25 Those in favor stated that the power of the Algerians had risen to fearful heights. Only
a squadron of six to eight frigates, with 40-50 cannons each, could keep them in check.
The admiralties would not be able to cover the expense; thus the country should bear
the cost by installing a Rederye following loosely the model of the Dutch West India
Company (WIC) or Dutch East India Company (VOC). The Rederye should be formed as a
joint-stock company with 10,000 shares; the total capital should be one million guilders.
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This  would  suffice  to  finance  the  war.  Moreover,  the  Rederye  would  redeem  all
Europeans taken on Dutch ships by the North Africans provided that they had defended
themselves and respected the general regulations for sailors.
26 The counter-arguments were rather straightforward. This war should be waged by the
admiralties  since  such  a  Rederye  would  be  non-transparent  and  even  potentially
dangerous for the diplomatic standing of the Dutch Republic. Also, it was doubted that
this could really work: too few Algerian corsairs were to be caught. Finally, taxation on
Dutch shipping elsewhere in the world could not be justified merely for the defense of
the Mediterranean trade. Such an argument would have been unthinkable in Great
Britain, but in a decentralized Republic particularism could and did play an important
role, even in matters of national interest.
27 The details of pros and cons were followed by nearly three pages of debate. Here again
Schrijver justified the Rederye. He pointed out the grave situation of the Republic’s
shipping and the current impuissance van s’Lands Zeemagt (weakness of the country’s sea
power). He deemed it right to have one thousand shares himself as compensation for
his hard work. The Rederye would not become uncontrollable since it would have to
report  regularly  on  its  administration.  Any  mismanagement  would  have  the  same
consequences as in Britain, where Parliament was making an example in the case of the
South Sea Company. Schrijver responded sharply to the charge that the cities were not
sufficiently present in the administration of the Rederye. According to him, the WIC
had been a flourishing company for decades and of great use to the Republic. Its ruin
had been caused by the interference of too many meede regenten (co-administrators). 
28 The project was signed by 75 merchants and companies, mostly from Amsterdam, with
Schrijver  at  the  top.48 This  was  clearly  an  attempt  to  overcome  one  of  the  most
anachronistic  structures  of  the  Republic,  namely  the  division  of  the  maritime
administration  into  five  admiralties.  In  1720,  the  Amsterdam  merchant  elite  was
obviously very dissatisfied with the inefficiencies that had allowed the Algerians to
prey undisturbed on Dutch ships for the past five years. Yet, their idea was not to unify
the admiralties into a single one. Instead, they conceived a joint-stock company. This
may well have been the rock on which the project foundered. That year, joint-stock
companies  had  a  bad  reputation  after  the  South  Sea  Bubble  crisis  in  London.49 In
Hamburg, the senate prohibited the formation of a joint-stock insurance company to
prevent speculation.50 The Dutch merchants of 1720 were in this regard perhaps too
nostalgic. The glory and power of the former WIC and the existing VOC blinded them to
the reality of stronger centralization of power and administration at the state level in
Western  and  Northern  Europe.51 Had  the  merchants  demanded  unification  of  the
admiralties, they might have succeeded. But in the form it was presented, the project
could only give rise to fierce opposition by the current power-holders at the regional
and local levels  without  gaining enough support  from those  in  favor  of  a  stronger
centralized Republic.52
29 In the end the States-General rejected the project but implemented its military essence.
The Republic decided to send a squadron of eight warships to Gibraltar to hunt North
African  corsairs.  The  admiralty  of  Rotterdam  was  to  fit  out  two  of  these  ships,
Amsterdam four,  Zeeland one and the Noorderquartier  one.  The costs  were shared
among each admiralty college. The Amsterdam admiralty was in charge. François van
Aerssen  van  Sommelsdijck  commanded  the  squadron,  which  began  its  operations
around Gibraltar in 1721.53 Madrid approved of the Dutch action and helped by opening
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up Spanish  harbors  and  giving  naval  assistance.  Unfortunately,  Dutch  ships  lacked
speed, and therefore the results were disappointing in 1721. With Spanish aid, they
destroyed three small Algerian ships on the Moroccan coast. Three Dutch ships were
liberated and 50 Algerians captured.54 However, that same year, nine Dutch ships with
196  seamen  were  caught  by  the  Algerians;  the  balance  for  this  year  was  strongly
negative for the Republic.55
30 In  1721  a  fierce  debate  broke  out  in  the  States-General  about  the  role  the  United
Provinces wanted to play in European politics. The deputy of Holland spoke strongly in
favor of massively increased war efforts to obtain a peace treaty. Due to negligence and
laziness, the United Provinces had declined, and a Republic that was once so powerful
that it had defied the greatest sea powers was now exposed to blame and scorn because
of the insults of a few Algerian Sea Rovers. Thus, its inhabitants faced either ruin or
slavery. In the meantime trade and shipping, and consequently the influx of seafarers,
were diverted to other nations, and once they were gone they would not easily come
back.56
31 Perhaps  the  greatest  blow  Dutch  shipping  suffered  from  1713  to  1745,  the  longest
period  of  neutrality  in  eighteenth-century  Europe,  occurred  in  1721-22.  Until  then
British shipping had also remained rather weak in Southern Europe. The reversal of
trends in 1722, when British shipping took over the lead, signaled the end of Dutch
dominance in shipping to Southern Europe.57 It  is  therefore not surprising that the
Dutch intensified their war efforts: the Mediterranean squadron was strengthened with
a  ninth  ship  in  November  1723,  the  Wageningen,  under  the  command  of  Cornelis
Schrijver,  the  proponent  of  the  1720  project.  It  was  a  newly  built  frigate  with  the
necessary speed to overtake the Algerian chebeks. With this ship, Schrijver caught an
Algerian privateer in June 1724 and sank another one in October of the same year. From
1721 to 1724 the Dutch lost a total of 25 ships with 137 sailors to the Algerians and were
in turn able to destroy four Algerian ships and take 167 Algerian captives. While the
Algerians were usually sold as slaves in Spain, the Dutch captives filled the bagnos of
Algiers. Faced with many losses even though the Dutch waged this war, the Hanseatics
no longer dared to send ships to the Mediterranean. After 1725, much of Hamburg’s
and Lübeck’s long-distance shipping was carried out in British vessels. The British now




32 At the beginning of May 1724, negotiations took place between Algiers and the Dutch.
However, in consideration of the insubstantial losses the Algerians had suffered during
the  war  and  the  Dutch  refusal  to  deliver  war  materials  on  an  annual  basis,  these
negotiations soon foundered.59 In 1725 the war took another turn for the worse for the
Dutch, who captured two Algerian ships with 62 sailors, but lost ten ships with 76 men.
33 The Dutch had to face the fact that the last ten years of conflict with Algiers had shaken
the  shipping  activities  of  their  Republic  in  one  of  its  traditionally  most  profitable
regions. In the meantime, the French had been able to take away a large slice of this
market  in  the  Levant,  while  the  British  had  made  inroads  on  the  shipping  lanes
between the Baltic and the Mediterranean. At the beginning of 1726, Dutch shipping to
Southern Europe was low, while British shipping in the rich trades boomed, having
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solidly recovered from the Bubble crisis.60 It seemed as if the war would not lead to a
solution.
34 However, the Dutch still had one important card to play. In these years the Austrian
Company of  Ostend was at  its  height and made great profits  at  the expense of  the
Western  European  powers.61 In  1725,  after  some  pressure  from  the  sea  powers  to
disband the company, Austria had allied itself with Spain. The kingdoms of Prussia,
Great Britain and France reacted to counter the aims of these two powers (the return of
Gibraltar  to  Spain,  international  recognition  of  the  Pragmatic  Sanction  in  Austria,
acceptance of the Ostend Company) and formed the League of Hanover on 3 September
1725.  In the following months,  both alliances tried to attract other powers to their
cause. France and Great Britain tried fervently to get the Dutch Republic to join the
League. For the Dutch this was an excellent opportunity to demand help against the
Algerians in return.
35 At the beginning of 1726, the States-General sent a six-page memorandum in French to
France and Great Britain by. Its title was Considérations qui peuvent servir à donner des
justes idées sur une Alliance défensive entre la France, la Grande-Bretagne, et les Etats Généraux,
pour la sureté de la Navigation et Commerce contre les Algériens.62 According to it, natural
law obliged all civilized peoples to join together and destroy barbarians who practiced
piracy. Their “infame métier” (infamous business) consisted in never being at war with
all  European powers at once but rather at playing one off against the other. It  was
therefore a “devoir  commun” (common duty) to purge the seas of  them to maintain
reciprocal commerce and communication among states. Yet, not only did the European
powers sign peace treaties with these people who infected the ocean with their piracy,
but  they  also  included  special  clauses  in  intra-European  treaties  that  expressly
absolved them from any obligation to help the other party in case of attack by a North
African  power.  Was  it  therefore  surprising  that  the  United  Provinces  demanded  a
defensive  clause  for  reciprocal  aid?  No  prince  had  ever  claimed  that  a  defensive
alliance contradicted natural or international law. Nobody in Europe would deny that
the  barbarians’  conduct  had  given  Europeans  the  right  to  free  themselves  from
subjection.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  surprising  how  long  the  Europeans  had  let
themselves be their dupes “par une jalousie de Commerce” (for jealousy of trade). 
36 It  was  true,  the  memorandum  continued,  that  the  Algerian  affair  had  nothing  in
common with the specific goal of the treaty of Hanover, but this alliance was expressly
aimed  at  guaranteeing  free  commerce.  Thus  the  United  Provinces  could  justify
inserting the matter into the treaty of Hanover. Having tried and failed for ten years to
end this issue they saw no other means than to ally themselves with two kings who
basically shared the same interest even though their subjects took advantage, at the
moment, of the “interruption ou plustôt de la ruine totale d’une des principales branches du
Commerce des Provinces Unies” (interruption or rather the total ruin of one of the main
branches of the United Provinces’ trade). If one added that the United Provinces were
less interested than Great Britain in suppressing the Company of Ostend, their allies’
help in the Algerian affair would be a mark of consideration with which to reward the
Dutch for their intervention concerning the Austrian Company. The demand ran as
follows: the kings of Great Britain and France should help the Republic make peace with
Algiers.  If  they  were  not successful,  they  should  promise  to  make  common  cause
against  the  regency.  The  present  situation  not  only  encouraged  the  Algerians  to
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continue the war against the Dutch but even somehow forced them to do so, since they
had no other significant potential prey than the Dutch in Mediterranean waters.
37 With this long memorandum the Dutch made a very explicit request. Adherence to the
treaty of Hanover was to be had only in exchange for substantial support by the two
other great sea powers against the Algerians. The allegation that France and Britain
had  a  secret  understanding  with  the  Algerians  to  destroy  the  Dutch  was  a  sharp
critique.  Yet,  for  historians  of  today,  this  memorandum  would  sound  much  more
credible had the Dutch not demanded the freedom of navigation which the negotiations
aimed to withhold from the inhabitants of the Austrian Netherlands. It is interesting
that the Dutch seemingly did not perceive their double standard. 
38 The British were at first taken by surprise and rejected this demand. They had thought
at the beginning of 1726 that all difficulties caused by the Dutch joining the alliance had
been  settled,  and  now  they  found  themselves  faced  with  this  new demand.  It  was
unacceptable for them to break their hard-won and very advantageous treaties with
the Barbary powers. Parliament would certainly have rejected any such move out of
hand. The Dutch, however, ignored the British refusal. The British and French received
this news in February with great indignation. In March or April the coalition intended
to strike hard against the Ostend Company ships. Without the Dutch, this move would
be very risky, but the Republic dragged out the negotiations over months. The emperor
hoped that the enemies of the Ostend Company would soon divide over their significant
differences and thus, in conjunction with Spain, he tried to break away the smaller
continental powers, such as Hesse-Cassel, Prussia and the Dutch Republic. The Dutch
were very much at  odds with Britain,  since Algerian corsairs  had repeatedly  taken
refuge in Gibraltar or even hauled a Dutch prize into this harbor.  The fact  that an
Algerian ship had been able to escape Sommelsdyk’s squadron precisely at this time by
taking refuge in Gibraltar caused consternation in the Republic.63 Only in June was a
compromise  finally  reached.  The British closed their  Mediterranean harbors  to  the
Moroccans and Algerians and promised to join the Dutch war if peace could not be
reached within one year.64
39 Yet, this proposal was kept secret, and nobody ever asked the opinion of Parliament. In
1725 and 1726 the British consul in Algiers received several orders to prevent Algerian
ships from using Port Mahon or Gibraltar as a base or, as had occurred in the early
1720s, from sailing in the English Channel.65 The actual negotiations do not seem to
have been strongly  supported by the United Kingdom, according to  reports  by the
British consul on the final peace talks between the Dutch and Algiers. He wrote that he
was surprised by the conclusion of the peace, which had been possible through the
mediation  of  a  Jewish  merchant.66 France  had  not  been  involved  at  all;  the
correspondence between Versailles and its Algerian consul does not mention the talks
until the signing of the Dutch-Algerian treaty. We can therefore conclude that peace
was achieved more by military might than by diplomacy.  In spring 1726 the Dutch
indeed had their greatest success of the entire war against Algiers when the Algerians
lost three fully equipped battleships and were only able to capture five small Dutch
merchant  ships  with  few sailors.  Faced  with  the  eventuality  of  Britain  and  France
entering  into  war  – the  closing  of  British  harbors  to  their  ships  may  have  been
regarded as a first step in this direction – and with the evident improvement of the
Dutch means of warfare, the Algerians decided to settle with the Dutch. The French
consul  hints  that  the  Dutch blockade  of  the  Strait  of  Gibraltar  had  also  been very
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harmful  to  the  Algerians.67 In  September  1726  the  Dutch  agreed  to  pay  an  annual
tribute of war materials worth roughly 50,000 guilders in exchange for peace.68 Peace
was ratified, and the Dutch duly paid their tribute for the rest of the century.
 
Peace
40 In the end the Dutch had obtained their longed-for peace. The first letter from Ludwig
Hameken, the newly installed Dutch consul at Algiers, mentions the most important
steps to stabilize the peace. He demanded Mediterranean passports, since the Algerians
“geen  distincite  tusschen  Een  Hollander  weeten  ofte  Een  Hamborger” (cannot  distinguish
between a Hollander and a Hamburger).69 He soon received such documents, and peace
became the norm. However, in the end the result was not as profitable as expected.
When Britain went to war against Spain (1727-1729), the Dutch managed to get ahead of
their chief competitor. Yet the British merchants were now too well acquainted with
the Mediterranean to be ousted by such a short interruption. After the war, British
shipping into the Mediterranean surged ahead, and the Dutch were never again able to
compete.
41 Thanks to the end of the war against Algiers, the Dutch remained a respectable player
in the carrying trade to Southern Europe throughout the eighteenth century.70 This was
certainly not negligible, but it was far from what the Dutch had striven for when they
entered into a squadron war against Algiers. The hope in 1720 had been that a short
war  would  knock  the  Algerians  out  and  secure  Dutch  domination  of  the  southern
carrying trade. But in the bitter turn of events,  they had to fight for years,  endure
losses of many merchant ships and see their competitors chip away at the Dutch share
of trade to and within the Mediterranean.
42 Meanwhile Great Britain had become well acquainted with shipping to and from this
area. Many merchants along the German coast now chartered British rather than Dutch
ships to have their goods carried southwards.71 While the Dutch had lost energy and
money, the British had become a respected player in intra-European trade lines. This is
particularly evident when looking at British shipping in Livorno, the chief staple hub
for all Mediterranean trades. While an average of only 10.2 British ships coming from
Northeastern  Europe  visited  Livorno  from  1715  to  1719,  this  number  more  than
quadrupled  to  41.2  from  1723  to  1727.72 British  dominance  in  shipping  between
Northern  Europe  and  Livorno  was  never  threatened  significantly  again  until  the
Revolutionary  wars.73 Worse:  The  Dutch  not  only  lost  leverage  in  intra-European
transport  services  but  also  in  trade  as  a  result  of  the  downturn  in  their  shipping
activities. While the British became the dominant group of merchants in Livorno in the
1730s, the Germans (mostly from Hamburg) began to replace the Dutch merchants in
the same years within the shared German-Dutch nation of Livorno.74 In other words,
the  Germans  with  the  best  connections  to  the  Central-European hinterland met  in
Livorno with the British who offered cheap maritime freight. The reason for this is
complex  and  shall  only  be  sketched  here:  Not  many  eighteenth-century  British
merchants settled in central Europe, while German merchants eagerly emigrated to
Great Britain.75 Thus, a strengthening of British mercantile domination in the European
carrying trade was to the great advantage of the German merchant community all over
Europe, thanks to their strong stakes in the British trades. In contrast, the Dutch, who
had been strong in  connecting both land and sea  routes,  now lost  ground on land
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routes as a result of the structural hindrances relating to sea routes. For the Dutch,
shipping had never been just about offering transport services to others; it had often
been linked with the settlement of Dutch merchants in the most important ports of
Europe.76
43 British gains of market share in shipping and trade were made at a time when the
Dutch were desperately fighting the Algerians. The strong shipping capacity that the
British won in this decade of Dutch-Algerian conflict was an important boon to their
economy precisely when Atlantic trade under the Union Jack began to attain heights
hitherto unheard of.  The Dutch-Algerian conflict can thus be counted as one of the
most  important  factors  that  tilted  the  balance  in  favor  of  Great  Britain  in  the
competition between the two maritime powers and their national economies.
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ABSTRACTS
In 1715, just two years after the United Provinces had been able to conclude the War of Spanish
Succession,  the  Republic  received  a  declaration  of  war  from  the  Regency  of  Algiers.  The
disastrous results for Dutch shipping and trade in Southern Europe forced the conflict-weary
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Republic to wage a war of attrition. Only with great difficulties were the Dutch finally able to
‘defeat’ the Algerians after a long conflict in the Western Mediterranean and to conclude a long-
lasting  peace  in  1726.  The  war  years  had  meanwhile  allowed  British  shipping  to  rise  to
dominance in the profitable carrying trade between Northern and Southern Europe, a position
that the British held until the outbreak of the Revolutionary wars at the end of the eighteenth
century. The Dutch-Algerian war of 1715-1726 can be considered among the key conflicts of the
early modern age. It was one of the main causes of a structural shift of shipping hegemony from
the Dutch Republic to Great Britain.
En 1715, deux ans seulement après avoir pu mettre fin à la guerre de Succession d’Espagne, les
Provinces-Unies reçoivent une déclaration de guerre de la régence d’Alger.  Les conséquences
sont désastreuses pour la navigation et le commerce hollandais en Europe du Sud. La République,
pourtant affaiblie par de longues années de conflit, est obligée de mener une nouvelle guerre
épuisante. Ce n’est qu’avec grande difficulté que les Hollandais parviennent enfin à battre les
Algériens  en  Méditerranée  occidentale  et  à  conclure  une  paix  durable  en  1726.  Pendant  ces
longues années de guerre, les Britanniques s’imposent et s’emparent désormais des profits du
transport maritime entre l’Europe du Nord et l’Europe du Sud – une position qu’ils conservent
jusqu’au  début  des  guerres  révolutionnaires,  à  la  fin  du  dix-huitième  siècle.  Nous  pouvons
considérer la guerre entre Alger et les Provinces-Unies de 1715-1726 comme l’un des conflits
cruciaux de l’époque moderne, et comme l’une des principales causes du passage de l’hégémonie
maritime de la Hollande à la Grande-Bretagne.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Méditerranée, navigation, commerce, corsaires barbaresques, Provinces-Unies,
Grande-Bretagne, guerre
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